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Full Length Research Paper

The Beijing consensus versus the Washington consensus: The dilemma of Chinese engagement in Africa

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This study discusses the reason behind the Chinese hastened engagement in Africa. The study particularly emphasizes debates surrounding such massive involvements from the African, European and Chinese point of view focusing on the main tenets of Washington and Beijing consensuses. The study shows that Beijing consensus has been perceived cynically by traditional western power contending that Chinese involvement in Africa has been built on china's narrow, and parochial interest of grabbing African's resources on one hand, and reversing of democratization and human rights improvements taking shape on the continent. The pro- Chinese narratives, on the other hand, argue that Chinese involvement in Africa has been built on the continent's historical relations with China when fighting colonial imperialism and apartheid system. In addition, it is their shared experiences of humiliation and subjugation at the hand of western imperialist colonial power that coach China and Africa to free their relationship from western style of involvements in one another's domestic affairs. Africans view Chinese engagement in Africa optimistically as a relief from century-old "civilizing mission" of the former colonial powers. This article argues that besides Chinese soft and non-conditional loans and aids and its commitment to neutrality in its relation to African countries' domestic affairs, the historical legacies of western influence on Africa, their post-colonial military presences on the continent and their cultural imperialism through imposition of western values and norms has been increasing Africa's discontent with the western approach. These phenomena have been contributing enormously to Chinese engagement in Africa.

Key words: China, Africa, Washington consensus, Sino-phobia, Beijing consensus.

INTRODUCTION

In the current global political and economic structure, countries have to inter into either multilateral or bilateral relations to achieve their economic, political, cultural and social development. In these multifaceted relationships, there are growing international threats and opportunities that dictates countries to come together in the form of trade relations, diplomatic relations or environmental protection, fighting terrorism to prolong their presence in

such uneven international arena. The uneven nature of the current global environment; particularly, its ideological differences require countries and multinational companies to create trade and diplomatic ties either cooperatively or competitively to defend their common interests at regional and international levels.

The political and economic relationship between European and African countries in the 18th, 19th and up to the middle of 20th centuries was crafted mainly through colonial projects that aimed at scrambling African resources (humans and materials) for their growing industrial sectors. Upon independence, the dominant colonial powers retained their traditional economic dominance over African countries mainly through financial establishments in Washington DC.

According to Eneji and Onyinye (2012), the historical relationship between Africa and the west has been based on the imperialists' interest of mercantilism and creation of weak or "rogue governments in Africa in order to gain access to some of the continent's most promising deposits of oil, minerals and markets."

The western involvement in Africa's economic and political issues has strongly linked to their colonial motives mainly the extraction of raw materials to boost their economy at the expense of the colonized African countries. Amorte et al. (2009) also investigated the post-colonial relationship between Nigeria and Britain, and described their economic ties after decolonization as follows:

"During the colonial era, Britain was Nigeria's leading trading partner. In 1955, 70% of Nigeria's exports were to Britain and 47% of its imports were from there. This went on until the 1970s, with the United States replacing Britain as the chief trading partner of Nigeria- in 1988".

This indicated that major traditional western powers retained their economic dominance over African countries even after the continent was formally decolonized from the long years of colonization.

Unlike the relationship between African and European which involves colonization, China-Africa relation has been based on their shared historical legacies of struggle against colonialism, colonial exploitation and "struggle for national liberation" (Uchehara, 2009).

These historical ties of "anti- imperialistic and anti-colonial struggle" by the peoples of Africa and Asia bring them together to create deep economic and political linkages (ibid). Since "independence", Africans view the European involvement in Africa with great scrutiny and suspicions, whereas they consider Sino-African relations positively as emancipation from the western legacies of colonial exploitation, racism and racial discriminations. This study discusses dilemmas faced by Africans over the choices of the Beijing and the Washington Consensuses.

The study addresses underlying policy principles and beliefs designed by Beijing and Washington to define their engagements in Africa. In doing so, unpacking the main tenet of the Washington and Beijing Consensus is very important to outline their underlying differences in their approaches towards African countries.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study entirely depends on secondary sources such as academic articles; published policy documents on Sino-African relation and literatures regarding western conceptualization of Chinese involvement in Africa are among the documents utilized by the author. It is qualitative review of most recent documents related to the topic under investigations. In the next section of the study, Washington Consensus with particular emphasizes on its mission to Africa is discussed. The Washington consensus is discussed first because it was the use, and the debates on the Washington consensus that led to the coining of the Beijing consensus.

The Washington consensus

It was the end of the World War II that brought three International Financial Institutions called the Bretton Wood Institutions (IMF, World Bank and WTO (previously GATT) to the international political environments. These institutions were established by America, and its allies to steer global economic and political phenomena in their own favour under the auspices of the American leadership (Eichengreen, 2000). The prominent scholar of International Political Economy, Robert Gilpin described the Post War global politics and economic condition in his book: *Global Political Economy, Understanding the International Economic Order* as follows:

"In creating the post–World War II regimes, the most important task for American leadership was to promote international cooperation. The United States undertook the leadership role, and other economic powers (Canada, Japan, and Western Europe) cooperated for economic, political, and ideological reasons. These allies believed that a liberal world economy would meet their economic interests and solidify their alliance against the Soviet threat. In addition, cooperation was greatly facilitated by the fact that these nations shared an ideological commitment to a liberal international economy based on free trade and open markets. All three factors—leadership, cooperation, and ideological consensus—were important to creation of the post–World War II liberal international economy" (Gilpin and Jean, 2001).

It was this dream of curving international cooperation that centred upon the ideology of liberal world economy as well as solidification of alliances against the Soviet threat that finally resulted in the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions. These institutions have been at forefront in term of mushrooming policies and policies success preconditions for their allies in Africa and Latin American countries particularly in the Cold War era.

However, over the years, the dismal performance of developing countries under the guidance of the Bretton Woods Institutions led many Latin American and African countries to question the effectiveness of the ideologies and principles prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (Sanusi, 2012). It was this criticism against the Bretton Woods Institutions that finally brought the concept of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that further aimed at tutoring African and Latin American countries to further realign their monetary and fiscal policies towards the prescription of the Bretton Woods Institutions (Sanusi, 2012). According to the policies of SAPs, to apply for loan and aid, developing country should "undergo stringent economic and structural reforms" (Gilpin and Jean, 2001). The reforms were outlined based on the liberal economic ideology of America and its European allies which has been inherently linked to historical supremacy of their system.

It was these series of restructuring of the economy of developing countries by Bretton Woods Institutions that led John Williamson to coin the tern "the Washington Consensus" in his list of principal macroeconomic reforms of 1989 (Williamson, 1993). The core principles of the Washington Consensus as indicated by John Williamson are the following:

Fiscal discipline (Governments should aim to restrict budget deficits to a level that can be financed in a non-inflationary manner); a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructures; Tax reform (Governments should aim to raise revenue by a broad tax base combined with moderate marginal tax rates); Interest rate liberalization (Governments should aim for domestic financial liberalization); A competitive exchange rate (The exchange rate should be unified and set at a level that is competitive.); Trade liberalization, Liberalization of FDI inflows; Privatization, Deregulation (in the sense of abolishing barriers to entry and exit) Secure property rights; Inward foreign direct investment should be allowed without restriction; State enterprises should be privatized; Entry and exit to industries should be de-regulated; secure property rights (property right should be extended to the informal sector) (Williamson, 1999).

Williamson (1999) reforms were derived from the liberal economic ideology of the western countries to facilitate their economic, political, social, military and cultural influences on the developing countries through perpetuation of developing countries' economic dependencies on western economy. When reflecting on these phenomena, Ismi (2004) indicated as follows:

Under SAPs, Africa's external debt has increased by more than 500% since 1980 to $333 billion today. SAPs have transferred $229 billion in debt payments from Sub-Saharan Africa to the West since 1980. This is four times the region's 1980 debt. In the past decade alone, African countries have paid their debt three times over yet they are three times as indebted as ten years ago. Of Sub-Saharan Africa's 44 countries, 33 are designated heavily indebted poor countries by the World Bank. Africa, the world's poorest region, pays the richest countries $15 billion every year in debt servicing. This is more than the continent gets in aid, new loans or investment. (Ismi, 2004).

Emphasizing its deadly consequences on the African economy, Kolodko (1998) also described the Washington Consensus as follows:

"The Washington consensus had the following message: 'Liberalize as much as you can, privatize as fast as you can, and be tough in monetary and fiscal matters'" (Gregorz Kolodko, in *Transition,* 1998).

Many scholars and policy makers have considered Washington consensus as western imposed ideology, values and norms on the poor countries; the case which Williamson himself appreciated as it stimulates further policy debates among the major international players (Kennedy, 2010). One of these scholars is former chief of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz who described this situation very clearly as quoted below:

Whatever, its original content and intent, the term "Washington Consensus", in the minds of most people around the world, has come to refer to development strategies focusing around privatization, liberalization, and macro-stability (meaning mostly price stability); a set of policies predicated upon a strong faith – stronger than warranted --in unfettered markets and aimed at reducing, or even minimizing, the role of government (Stiglitz, 2004).

Africans have viewed and continuing to view these lists reforms as the tools used by the former colonial powers to limit sovereign independence of African states. According to Stiglitz (2004), "the Washington consensus" failed to recognize the nature of the developing countries, and the place of technologies in the changing of the market. He argued that the market alone could not steer the economy towards the right direction as proposed by the Washington consensus rather he argues that there has to be a space for government intervention to effect changes for better as recognized by successful East Asian countries, but "Washington consensus did not" (Stiglitz, 2004).

In addition, the concepts of externalities that include environmental pollutions, and issues of public goods are not clearly mentioned in the Washington consensuses (Stiglitz, 2004), which make the idea very narrow and less holistic to be called the consensus.

To be called a consensus, there has to be equal voices in deciding and constructing a given idea, policy and procedure among all the stakeholders. The Washington consensus is not a consensus like this, or to put appropriately, there is no universal consensuses at all in "the Washington consensus". It was coined as "the consensus" simply because it was derived from the western values and norms they wanted to transfer to Africa as part of their historical ties to the continent (Robel, 2010). This perceived supremacy of the western values was inherent to colonialism. It can be argued that, the idea of the supremacy of the system represents the continuation of colonial form of interaction between Africa and the western world.

The Washington Consensus's advice for Africa country is one that says; "western model is perfect model for all, and should be replicated as prescribed by the owner of the system". However, within this prescriptions, African countries found that the system allows not only the involvement of western government into their internal affairs but also create huge opportunities for their multinational companies to gain access to African markets and resources at the expense of Africa's domestic industrial firm (Ismi, 2004). By forcing governments to liberalize economies for foreign companies and thereby driving large number of African domestic firms from market, Washington consensus has fueled social unrest, disharmonies and inequalities and encouraged regime change in some Africans countries, for instance, in the case of Benin, Kenya, Ghana…etc (Mahuku and Mbanje, 2013).

The cumulative effect of all these chaos further deteriorated the country's international prestige as the government try to silence opposition parties by using excessive forces. It was this unequal and superior-subordinate nature of the western approaches that finally forced many African policy makers to push to the edge the policies of international monetary fund (IMF) and World Bank for a more formal and welcoming Chinese rhetoric policies of equal partnership and cooperation for mutual gain. As part of its commitment to equal partnership and sovereign equality, China has no functioning military bases in the continent (ibid).

China-Africa relations has been based on mutual dialogue and cooperation, respecting each other's culture, provisions of loan and aid with no political conditioanalities attached, and defending each other's interest at regional and international levels.

In conclusion, western involvement in Africa through the Washington consensus has mirrored the colonial "mission of civilizing" the continent. The western interest in Africa has always been creating a "rouge state" that would remain totally dependent on the western countries' economic and military power to easily spread their values to the developing countries. There have been no features in the Washington consensus that indicates any commitments between developing and developed countries to design genuine policy of equal partnership and cooperation and respecting sovereign equality of the state. The principles listed in Washington consensus emulate colonial motive that bread dependency of the developing countries on the policies of the western world. These modes of relationship have been proven more disgusting to Africa countries to approve enthusiastically because of its resemblances with colonial ambitions of superior-subordinate relationship.

The Beijing consensus

The concept of Beijing consensus was developed to characterize the Chinese development model. Many scholars argue that unlike Washington consensus that is supported by lists of policies to be adopted by countries seeking loan, and aid from Bretton Woods Institutions, Beijing consensus has been devoid of any unilaterally formulated policy reforms to be adhered by the states.

In addition, unlike the Washington consensus, Beijing consensus does not claim existences of any values and principles that it promotes as a universal value. "Instead, China stays committed to a multi-polarity of ideas, in which different models can exist peacefully next to each other. The most obvious effect of recognizing this is its denying universality of one's own approaches especially in its relations with developing countries" (Robel, 2010). China stresses that each country has to find its own methods, policies and institutions that fit its local requirements instead of copying what has been apparently successful in another place.

Joshua Cooper Ramo coined the term "Beijing consensus" in 2004 when he wrote a book entitled "*The Beijing Consensus"* in which he outlined an "ambitious objective to debunk the famous doctrine of the "Washington Consensus" (Huang, 2011).

Ramo presented in his book alternatives to the economic goals of the "Washington Consensus" that built on post-World War II American economic policy of private property rights, economic opening, financial reforms, macroeconomic stability, and political liberalization to promote economic growth both at home and abroad (ibid). America pursued these economic doctrines throughout the cold war with much confusion due to global oil crisis and developing countries debt crisis respectively.

The end of the cold war brought much confusion to the western involvements into Africa. Unlike the cold war era that attracted the western countries to Africa particularly to contain the communist expansion throughout the continent, "the end of the Cold War marked at least temporary end of western strategic interests on the continent" (Tull, 2008). Since the end of cold war, Europeans failed to put sustainable and new relations with sound ideological backing with Africa and instead left primary responsibility to the Bretton Woods institutions to deal with African through policies of Structural Adjustment

Programs (SAP) that by and large have had disastrous consequences for much of the continent (ibid).

Unlike the percept of the Washington Consensus which dictates African countries to restrict their macro-economy policy, reduction of public spending and commitment to transparency and accountability and holding of democratic and competitive election, the Beijing Consensus is predicated on non-interference in domestic affairs and the promotion of sovereign integrity (Shelton, 2012). One of the democratically elected presidents of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade (Financial Times, January 24, 2008, quoted in Condon, 2012:13) reiterated the need to align African government along the Asian line when he stated as follows:

"...the Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa. With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has helped African nations build infrastructure projects in record time—bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, dams, legislative buildings, stadiums and airports. In many African nations, including Senegal, improvements in infrastructure have played important roles in stimulating economic growth. . . . It is a telling sign of the post-colonial mindset that some donor organizations in the west dismiss the trade agreements between Chinese banks and African states that produce these vital improvements—as though Africa was naïve enough to just offload its precious natural resources at bargain prices to obtain a commitment for another stadium or state house. . . . I have found that a contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank, takes three months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in good governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our ability to act—and when poverty persists while international functionaries drag their feet—African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter solutions."

Therefore, the traditional partners characterized by "the Washington Consensus and its "civilizing mission" to Africa turned to be unacceptable for many Africans as the only option. It was this conviction of conditionality of aid, long term negotiation to secure loan, and bureaucratic nature of the Washington Consensus that dictates many African governments to legitimize their shift from their traditional partners to China. Almost all African countries are turning increasingly to China as an alternative source for infrastructural loans badly needed to improve the life of Africans.

To recognize the shift of many African countries from traditional partners to China, it is better to look at the volume of trade between Africa and China over the last few decades. The trade between China and Africa increased by 700 percent during the 1990s and surged from US$3 billion in 1995 to US$32 billion in 2005 and about US$55 billion in 2007 heralding the flourishing of

huge trade relations among Africa countries and the China (Roy, 2014). In 2009, China became Africa's No. 1 trade partner. In the following two years, the scale of China-Africa trade expanded rapidly.

In 2012, the total volume of China-Africa trade reached US$198.49 billion, a year-on-year growth of 19.3%. Total China-Africa trade volume, China's export volume to Africa and China's import volume from Africa all reached new highs (China African Policy white paper, 2013:3). For example, there are about eleven investment agreements between China and Africa's most populous country, Nigeria from 2001 to 2010. In 2002, there were about four major investment agreements between China and Nigeria as indicated Table 1.

As indicated earlier, there has been impressive economic cooperation between China and Africa since 1990s, showing unprecedented level of economic cooperation between countries in the recent history of our world. For examples, within ten years (2000 to 2012), Sino- African trade has passed from USD 10 billion to USD 200 billion (Manrique, 2015). According to The Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) Action Plan (2016 to 2018), China will increase its stock of direct investment in Africa from USD 34.4 billion in 2014 to USD 100 billion in 2020 (FOCAC, Johannesburg Action Plan 2016 to 2018).

FOCAC provide smooth and continuous interaction between African countries and China by providing high-level diplomatic forum on which Africa and China deliberate over their strategic cooperation on different economic sector. Unlike "the Washington Consensus" which based on the policy of Bretton Woods institutions, FOCAC provide opportunities for deliberations for mutual agreements and cooperation between African and Chinese governments.

According to Chinese MOFA (2006), the general principles and objectives that guide Chinese foreign policy towards Africa are; sincerity, friendship and equality (the political aspect); mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity (the economic aspect); mutual support and close coordination (the international aspect); and learning from each other and seeking common development (the social and cultural aspect). These are how Chinese views and wishes to conduct its relationship with Africa. These principles run contrary to the Washington Consensus's principles of tutoring African governments to channel their economic, social, cultural and political policies towards the western orthodox principles without considering the unique situation of the socio-political conditions in Africa.

In creating economic, political and cultural ties with Africa, China follows its historic principles of friendship and collaboration of fighting colonialism, mutual benefit and reciprocity when creating trade relations with one another, learning from each other through social and cultural exchanges. China follows policy of "attaching no political strings", bilateral respect of sovereignty and national integrity and non- intervention to domestic affairs and

Table 1. four major investment agreements between China and Nigeria.

S/N	Types of agreement	Year
1	Agreement on trade, investment promotion and protection	2001
2	Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to tax and income	2002
3	Agreement on consular affairs	2002
4	Agreement on cooperation on strengthening management of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and diversion of precursor chemical	2002
5	Agreement on tourist cooperation	2002
6	Strategic partnership agreement	2005
7	A memorandum of understanding on investment cooperation between the federal ministry of commerce of Nigeria and ministry of commerce of India	2006
8	Economic cooperation agreement between Nigeria and Xinguang international group of China	2006
9	Agreement against fake products exported to Nigeria from China	2009
10	Memorandum of understanding on promotion bicameral economic co operation and partnership between Ogun State of Nigeria and Zhejiang Province of China	2009
11	Memorandum of understanding on peace co-operation 2010	2010

Sources: Egbula (2011) West African challenges No. 05.

equal treatment of one another and protection of shared interest at regional and global levels (Aydin and Tekin, 2015).

China has been providing assistances free of conditionality, grants loan at a very low rate payable after a long period of time, offered training for professionals and technical personnel. The west's employment of conditionality of aid and recent humiliation of China at the hand of former colonial power of unequal treaties foisted on China and recently by USA, which was characterised by conditioanalities and gesture to interfere into internal political situation of China, shaped the Sino-African relations free of such features (Alden, 2008 cited in Schiere, et. al. 2011).

China-Africa Deepening Cooperation in the Eyes of the Sino-Phobic Narrations

America and its western allies have already developed Sino-phobia. According to their Sino phobic narratives, "China is new colonial power, spoiler of peace of oil rich countries such as Sudan and supporter of despotic government" such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe which are known by their poor human rights records. Moreover, "China is resource and energy hungry giant, an exploiter of corrupt and incompetent governments, a trade opportunist and massive polluters of the African environment" (Mehari, 2013).

While China argues Sino-African relations as based on the principles of fraternity and goodwill for mutual gain and development, traditional western powers present Chinese engagements in Africa as derived from Chinese narrow economic and political interest of extracting African resources, promoting corruption and authoritarian regime,

damage anti-poverty efforts and reckless to environmental issues (Aydin and Tekin, 2015).

The study conducted by Shelton and Kabemba (2012) provided very inclusive and holistic western critics regarding ever growing and deepening Sino- African cooperation as follows:

"Western critics contend that China's African agenda is driven by China's narrow self-interests, and thus often undermines efforts to promote regional peace and democratization. China's urgent drive to access the continent's strategic resources may not favour local development, while the European Union (EU)-United States (US) vision of an Africa governed by western-style democracies, the rule of law and free markets is being challenged by Beijing's offer of non-interference and infrastructure in return for resources"(Shelton and Kabemba, 2012).

As indicated here, western countries feared that aid and loans given for African countries without any precondition would impede development of democracy, free trade and human rights in the continent. China's firm commitments in providing free or soft loan and huge investment opportunities under the pretext of non-interference in domestic issues of African country has been viewed as a pragmatic policy option dominated by hustle economic ambitions at best and insurrection of war and support of authoritarian government at worst. Today, Sino-African relations have been seen as a threat in the western countries because Africans are deciding on their fate of developing their institutions and expending their aid and loan without rigorous directions from the external forces. China is reversing historical "civilizing mission" of the western world in Africa which is a threat to centuries of the

western world.

The Pro-China narrative depicts China as "a savior and genuine partner of Africa". This camp further argues that, "China is a partner without a history of colonial aspirations and, in fact, shares with many developing countries a similar historical background". It also is a partner that provides much-needed funding with no conditional strings attached and that appears to understand Africa's priorities. Furthermore, it has a reputation among African countries for respecting other cultures and states (Mehari, 2013). Many Africans have considered and continued to consider the shift from traditional partners to China as a relief from century old agonizing colonial history of slavery and exploitation. Africans consider their new ties with China as emanated from continual historical assistance given to African in the fight against colonialism, apartheid system and underdevelopments in Africa.

Recent data on Sino- African relationship indicated that Sino-African cooperation has entered a new chapter. The 2016 FOCAC held in South Africa indicated increasingly deepening cooperation between China and Africa in all endeavours including security issues. FOCAC was launched in 2000 in Beijing as a tri-annual collective dialogue platform for cooperation between Africa and China. The second Africa-China Cooperation Forum Summit, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa on the fourth and fifth of December 2015, under the theme *"China-Africa Progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development"*, endorsed the Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Action (African Union Directorate of information and communication press release, No.268/2016).

During the meeting, unprecedented economic, political, social and cultural cooperation was promised between African countries and China. During the closing ceremony, Chinese prime minister commented, "the meeting was perfect and extraordinary" (Xuejun, 2016). The final outcome of the summit was the adoption of multiple agreement among which five major pillar for china Africa cooperation are extraordinary. These include "*equality and mutual trust in politics, win-win cooperation in the economy, mutually enriching cultural exchanges, mutual assistance in security and solidarity, and coordination in international affairs"* (ibid).

Specifically, in the areas of development cooperation, the Johannesburg Action plan states that China's assistance will be primarily used in the areas of human resources development, infrastructure, medical care and health, agriculture, food security, climate change response, desertification prevention and control, and wildlife and environmental protection, and for humanitarian purposes, with the aim to help African countries alleviate poverty, improve people's livelihoods and build up capacity for independent African development (FOCA, Johannesburg Action Plan, 2016-2018: 20-24).

On the Johannesburg Summit, China promised to offer 20,000 degree education opportunities in China and 30,000 government scholarship for African countries, welcome more African youths to study in China, innovate and expand more ways to training and train more African professionals on economic development and technical managements (ibid). With regard to cultural cooperation, both side pleaded to respect the unique culture of one another and uphold dialogue between Chinese and African culture to contribute to the development and prosperity of the world culture (FOCA, Johannesburg Action Plan, 2016-2018, p. 29).

With regard to security cooperation, China promised to provide African Union with US$ 60 of free military assistance over the next three years, support the operationalization of African Peace and Security Achitecture, including the operationalization of the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis and the African Standby force. Furthermore, the two sides agreed to undertake mutual visits by defence and military personnel for information and intelligence exchange between themselves (FOCA, Johannesburg Action Plan, 2016-2018, p. 34-35).

Regardless of these massive and deep involvements of China into Africa, many Africans indicated that Chinese involvement in Africa has not been free from harm. According to Fantu and Obi (2011), the main criticism targeted at China in its relations with African has been their blindness towards the human rights and democracy in the continent. Chinese friendship with many African leaders known by abusing their citizens' human and democratic rights has been the growing concern not only for the western countries but also for some Africans.

Similarly, Chinese cheap industrial products are flooding the African markets. "The displacement of local manufacturing firms by Chinese cheap products has aroused growing anti-Chinese sentiment and popular antipathy across the continent" (Fantu and Obi 2011).

Another widely recognized critic of Africa's trade structure with China indicated that Sino-Africa merchandise trade mirrors Africa's total trade with the rest of the world. Natural resources underpin the continent's exports to China. In 2012, 93.5% of China's imports from Africa consisted of primary commodities, such as oil and minerals, precious stones and non-monetary gold. This represents an increase of more than 7% points from 2002, when primary commodities constituted 86% of imports. When evaluating Africa's export profile in relation to, for example, the United States (US), a similar trend emerges. In 2012, 87.5% of US imports from Africa were primary commodities, down from a high of 92.8% in 2007 (Edinger and Sandrey, 2013).

Conclusion

The nature of state interaction has been continually changing. The rapid rise of China as a global power has

changed the traditional notion of western hegemony. Investment and trade relations between China and Africa has increased very rapidly reaching multi-billion dollars reflecting a significant shift of African's trade and investment relations from their traditional western partners to China under the umbrella of South- South cooperation.

There have been contradictory narratives over this paradigm shift. This contradiction presents dilemma to identify the best partners for African peoples. These contradictions have been based on the ideological differences followed by China and Africa's traditional partners. Pro-western narratives in these contradictory debates argue that Sino-African relations has been built on shaky ground and disastrous for Africa's long term dream of achieving viable democracy and liberal economy for sustainable and inclusive socio-political developments.

The West mainly believed that China economic relation with Africa have been motivated by China's narrow economic interest of robbing raw materials from feeble and fragile African states by confusing them with provision of huge concessional loan, no conditionality stringed aid and investment opportunities. For pro-westerners, China's policy of non- interference in the domestic affairs of African state represented the repudiation of African peoples' urgent need for good governance, respect to human rights, democratization and free market economy. Dominant country like USA consider Chinese mode of involvement in Africa as new threat to western interests of transferring western values and norms to African countries.

The opposite narrative articulates that African people welcome the Chinese engagement in Africa more than they discourage western involvement in the continent. For many Africans, western approaches have been built on the century old concept of the supremacy of the system and unilaterally decided principles that many Africans fail to accept, as it does not include their voices. These street-jacket-advice has been denounced by many African countries believing that these advices further puts Africa into deep downturn and increases African dependency on the western governments and their multinational companies by allowing them free and unrestricted access to African resources.

The wound of colonialism which is still fresh in the mind of many Africa peoples has also a legitimizing effects on the engagement of China into Africa convincingly in light of the pervious humiliation of African peoples under the colonial power. China is free from such kind of historical and psychological ties with Africa that one looks in to remember how much worst it was, instead, China was partner to Africa in the fight against colonialism and apartheid making China the best friend of Africa.

Many Africans have condemned the western interest of transferring western values and norms through their military and economic intervention into domestic politics of Africa in many ways. Firstly, it has been indicated in this study that the relation between Africa and its traditional partners has been based on the superior-subordinate relations and thus has echoed colonialism. Secondly, Africans have understood that reliance on the policies of the western backed institutions (Bretton woods Institutions) will continue to perpetuate their dependency on the western world that has been a failure story for many African and Latin American countries in 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. These historical failures of western institutions and the convictions that these institutions would increase Africa's dependency on western world, make Africans to distance themselves from prescription of the western government. Thirdly, the western military presence in the continent and their growing influences on the domestic affairs of African countries has a negative effect in their relationship to Africa. Post-colonial African state has witnessed western interventions through arrangement of fake election by the name of democracy, conditionality of aid and loan, pressurizing governments to open politics and economy, excluding government that stand against their interests from public international forum and changing regime through false elections are the sign of western interventionist approach which mirrored also colonialism.

In addition, their relentless supports to the government that up hold their stand at regional and international level as reflect in the west African state has a harmful effects on the western country's images in the eyes of many Africans. The existence of former colonial power military base in Africa and their continued influence on domestic affairs of many African countries indicate that the purpose of the Organization of African Unity to fight western colonial domination and apartheid system in Africa has yet to be completed. Western government should make themselves free from all these historical and current influences and domination on Africa to create sustained and smooth cooperation with African countries.

China's close relationship with Africa has also been emanating from several factors that run contrary to the western "civilizing mission". Firstly, unlike the former colonizers, China has no history of colonizing any nations and it has not been accused of it. Instead, China has been known by supporting colonized countries in their war against imperialism and colonialism. China has been advancing the core mission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to decolonize the continent. China has been a partner to Africa not only in time of peace but also on the struggle against colonialism and imperialism that made the continent one of the least developed continent today. China wrote off severe debts of 33 African countries which have close relations with the Chinese government (Aydin and Tekin, 2015).

Secondly, China-African trade relations have been based on the principles identified and discussed by both parties. China-African trade and investment relation is based on their mutual discussion, consensus, and deliberation through The Forum on China and Africa. China has been cautious of top-down involvements into

African sovereignty like Africa's traditional partners. Fourthly, Sino-Africa relations are based on principles of sovereign equality, neutrality in the domestic affairs of another state. Its does not condition its aid and loan intended for another country. Fifthly, as part of its commitment to remain free from any kind of intervention into sovereign independency of African countries, China has no any functioning military bases on the continent to promote its values and norms. With this policy, China is and will continue to challenge the western influences over Africa. China will continue to be the most important players that will shape the continent's future development.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

When party policies do not matter: Examination, the ambivalence of voting behaviors in the Zambian presidential elections

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Debates on whether people in Zambia cast their votes for a presidential candidate based on the good policies of the party or the qualifications of their candidate are peppered with tales of ethnicity, tribalism, corruption, and the education levels of the voters. These problems have undermined the credibility of the winning candidates as being put into office based not on their qualifications, but on the desire for individual voters to have someone of their tribe as president. While some scholars have argued that people are not naïve to vote for a candidate irrationally, others hanker on the fact that party policies are barely known to the Zambian voter who takes different forms of communal identities. The two approaches underscore the nascent debates of voting behaviors in Zambia today. Therefore, the aim of the study is to examine the voting behaviors of Zambians in the 2011 Zambian presidential election. Quantitative evidence suggests that party policies and manifestos in the Zambian elections do not matter because people base their votes on ethnic alignments.

Key words: Ethnicity, language, education, party policies, manifesto, Michael Sata, Hakainde Hichilema.

INTRODUCTION

The 2011 presidential elections marked the second time in Zambian history when the opposition party won against the ruling party. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was the first in 1991 with Frederick Chiluba winning against the 27-year reign of President Kenneth Kaunda. While it might be common that the opposition wins elections in developed nations, Zambia's cases are exceptional in Africa. That is why the International Institute for Justice and Peace (IIJP) declared the 2011 Zambian

elections as "setting an example for African politics" (October, 2011). In the 2011 elections, the ruling party (MMD) conceded defeat with a vote share of 36 (15%), while the opposition emerged victorious with a vote share of 42 (85%) (EISA election observer mission Zambia, 2011). In spite of these developments, critiques have questioned whether the 2011 presidential elections were indeed free and fair; and whether the people voted based on the principles of a 'free and fair' election as defined in

the constitution.

Arnold Moyo (2014) asserts that 'Free and Fair' elections are a key defining feature of a vibrant multi-party democracy and peace. They provide a public mechanism for regular peaceful institutional competition for power and the opportunity for people to change or review the government through their freely expressed will (Anyangwe, 2013). Moyo dissects the phrase 'Free and Fair elections' by arguing that 'Free' elections encompass an electoral process that is characterized by the enjoyment of civil and political rights, while 'Fair' refers to electoral processes where the electoral conditions such as the law and access to information are the same for all participants (p. 3). Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the other hand, states that one of the characterizing features of free and fair elections is the knowledge that the voters have about what they are voting for. The enticement for voting should not be based on promises that the candidates know they have neither the possibility nor intention of fulfilling, but rather on grounded well-articulated and achievable policy scheme and development objectives. These will become the important part of the criteria by which the people judge the suitability of candidates and ultimately their choice of a president (Maitra, 2009). However, the question as to whether party policies matter in Zambian politics is still relevant to many scholars. Unlike developed nations, many political parties in Zambia do not differ on policies (Von-Soest: 2007). During presidential campaigns, there is barely/less emphasis on the differences in party policies. The presidential candidates base their manifestos on promises of fulfilling what the ruling party has not fulfilled. This is the same manifesto that the ruling party gave when they were in the opposition (Moyo, p. 11). Such circumstances raise questions as to whether people vote based on the personality of the candidate or the kind of policies the party is propagating. For Daniel (2007), Zambian politics uses ethnic cleavages for electoral mobilization. Other scholars such as Naomi (1982) have argued against this thinking, contending that sometimes what we see as ethnic cleavages are just ways of expressing cultural and linguistic solidarity and have no bearing on voter preference. The content of party policies and the type of candidate are the main factors that explain voter preferences (p. 467). Many others have advanced the literature by separately discussing economic endowments, language composition, and education levels as shaping voter preferences (Zuber: 2013; Lupia and McCubbins: 1998) in Zambia and Africa at large.

Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to examine the reasons why people in Zambia choose to vote for one candidate over the other. It inquires whether ethnic identities or political party policies can better explain the voting behavior of the 2011 Zambian presidential elections. It seeks to answer questions of whether Zambian voters have firm opinions of the political parties they voted for, or cast their votes based on ethnic affiliations. Thus, understanding the degree for which

Michael Sata's Patriotic Front (PF) and Hakainde Hichilema's UPND parties attracted votes from their counterpart's tribe becomes relevant. Theoretical approaches have been designed to respond to such overarching debates about elections in Zambia.

This paper is structured in six parts. It starts by giving the profile of Zambia; highlighting the 73 major languages and how they get clustered into seven officially recognized languages. It then reviews existing literature on the subject and provides theoretical frameworks for studying voting behavior in Africa. The next section describes the data and method of operationalization. This is followed by the presentation of the findings/results and a discussion. Finally, the study concludes on the findings and suggests that Zambian elections be driven by informed policies made readily available in political manifestos and election campaigns.

Profiling Zambia's ethnic divisions

Zambia as a country is almost the size of Texas, with a total area of 752,618 square kilometers. It currently has an estimated population of 14.9 million, with an increased population of 11 million people since independence in 1964. The country is ethnically complex with 73 different tribes and languages currently identified. The complexity lies in the fact that Zambians are affiliated in various ways: through language, tribes, ethnicity, and religion which overlap closely with one another. While all the languages are considered relevant, the 73 languages are subsumed into 7 official languages. The national news is aired 8 times every day in the 7 languages as well as in English; another official language. The division of these languages is geographical in the sense that linguistic dialects are concentrated within ethnic localities. Table 1 and Figure 1 show a map and a chart summarizing the 73 languages and how each is linked to the 7 official languages.

Table 2 demonstrates the alignments of the seven official languages of Zambia towards the presidential candidates of the two major parties in Zambia. While President Michael Sata seems to only have two languages under him, he still stands to have more people under him because of the composition of the two languages. On the other hand, Nyanjas and Bembas are concentrated along the line of rail where development first started in Zambia. Although these places seem to be metropolitan for the most part, many people have converted themselves to either Bemba or Nyanja. In the early 50s and 60s, many people moved to these places to work for the rail line or the mines, and the children born in these areas identify themselves with either Bemba or Nyanja (Gertzel et al., 1984).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies on voting behaviors characterized by ethnicity, tribalism, and language composition, are among the

Table 1. Zambian language clusters.

Bemba	Tonga	Kaonde	Lozi	Lunda	Luvale	Nyanja
Aushi	Toka	Kosa	Kwandi	Ndembu	Luchazi	Tumbuka
Chishinga	Totela		Kwanga	Ng'umbo	Mbunda	Chewa
Kabende	Leya		Mbowe		Chokwe	Nsenga
Mukulu	Subiya		Mbumi		Nkoya	Fungwe
Ngumbo	Shanjo		Simaa		Mbwela	Yombe
Bwile	Few		Imilangu			Senga
Luunda	Ila		Mwenyi			Twambo
Shila	Lenje		Nyengo			Lambya
Bisa	Lundwe		Makoma			Wandya
Tabwa	Soli		Liyuwa			Nyiha
Lala	Lumbu		Mulonga			Kunda
Lamba	Sala		Mashi			Nyengo
Lima	Twa		Kwandu			Unga
Ambo			Mbukushu			Yombe
Mambwe						
Lungu						
Namwanga						

This table highlights the 73 languages of Zambia clustered into seven (7) languages.
Source: Gregory Gondwe (2017).

Languages spoken in each province

PROVINCE	LANGUAGE
Luapula	Bemba
Northern	Bemba
North-Western	Kaonde/Lunda/Luvale
Western	Lozi
Muchinga	Bemba
Eastern	Nyanja
Central	Bemba/Tonga
Copperbelt	Bemba
Lusaka	Nyanja
Southern	Tonga

Figure 1. Map of Zambia with its provinces. The map shows the divisions of Zambia by province, and the key table next to it presents the dominant languages in those provinces. While people have relocated in the past 50 years, the languages presented are still dominant in these areas.

Table 2. Mapping languages affiliated to the languages of the two presidential candidates

Michael Sata (Bemba)	Hakainde Hichilema (Tonga)
Bemba	Tonga
Nyanja	Lozi
	Lunda/Luvale
	Kaonde

Source: Gregory Gondwe (2017).

classical fields of social science inquiry, but remain an under-research area in Zambia (Posner, 2005) and Africa at large. Gertzel et al., (1984) and Adjei (2012) asserts that it is because the post-independence African countries

heralded as the most peaceful and champion of democracy in Africa (Baylies and Szeftel, 1997).

Language composition and voter influence in Zambia

The declaration of Zambia as a One-Party state in 1972 affected the voting pattern and voter turnout. According to Chikulo (1988), only 39.8% of the 1.7 million registered voters turned out to vote in the 1973 elections. This low turnout was the result of two main factors: First, voters did not see a candidate from their tribe that they could vote for, second, they assumed that a single tribe was taking over the leadership of Zambia.[1] The 1978 elections, on the other hand, presented a completely different picture. Of the 1.9 million registered voters, 66.9% cast their vote. As in previous elections, some provinces' turnout was higher than the national average: the highest polling provinces were Lusaka with 72.7%, Central with 72.5%, Eastern with 71.7% and Copperbelt with 71.7%. The lowest polls were recorded in Western Province with 44.6% and Southern Province with 59.8% (Chikulo, p. 39).

    The polls with the highest number of votes for President Kaunda came from provinces that either shared his ethnicity or tribe. The Western and Southern provinces of Zambia barely did not speak the language of President Kaunda, which explains why turnout was much lower here. The Northwest was a terra incognita to the politics of Zambia. Because of its geographical location and had less to contribute to the national economy, development and other national activities were almost cut off. It is little wonder that it recorded low votes. Although the economy was badly hit, it was surprising that the resentment for voting decreased among the Zambian citizens, from 19% in the 1978 polls to 4.5% in 1983. Despite this fact, the general voter turnout was low. For instance, 60.2% in 1973, 33.1% in 1978, and 34.5% in 1983. There is barely any study that exists to explain this resentment. Chikulo points out that if we accept the plausible thesis that low voter turnout reflects opposition to the regime, testing the thesis would require access to survey data showing the reasons people give for why they did not vote.

    Nonetheless, the low turnout in 1973 was held to be clear evidence of the widespread voting preference based on ethnicity and thus opposition to the introduction of the one-party state. It was widely assumed that the low poll was a protest vote, a "silent No vote" which gave the one-party state uncertainty (Croke, 2016). However, although the 39.8% turnout was a sharp drop from the impressive numbers registered during the sixties, it cannot be attributed solely to the establishment of the one-party state. The decline in voter turnout, as we have earlier argued can only be understood against the

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[1] At the time, Zambia only had a population of 4 million and everyone was concentrated in their own ethnic localities.

Ethnic grouping and voting in Zambia

Zambia's pattern of ethnic affiliations is a complicated phenomenon. It carries with it different patterns that are deeply rooted into one another. Essentially, the people see themselves as ethnically affiliated in two different ways: First, as members of one of the 73 tribes of the country and second, as speakers of one of the 7 official languages (Posner, 2005). Therefore, this complexity raises questions as to which affiliations they are most inclined to. Spanning a wide range of scholarly traditions, the conventional wisdom of Zambian politics is primarily characterized by patrimonial pattern exchanges that are not only deeply rooted in the Zambian cultures, but also perpetuated by the British colonial era (Bradley, 2011; Finnis, 2014). Since the country's independence in 1964, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) has had a dominant position in national politics. Initially, Zambia embraced multiparty politics, allowing various political parties to exist. Multiparty politics did not go well with the patrimonial cultures (Racker, 2003; Lindemann, 2010) because people were less exposed to other ethnic tribes, and thus were not receptive to candidates from other tribes. This led to factions in which people felt obliged to vote for people of their own tribe. At that time, each tribe was confined to its own province.

    Under such circumstances, President Kenneth Kaunda declared Zambia a "One-party" participatory democracy state in December, 1972. This establishment was a move aimed at managing and structuring political conflicts (Chinkulo, p. 29). Similarly, the electoral system was revised to structure and control competition within the one-party framework. For example, the Election Act of 1973, and the electoral rules and regulations which followed, strengthened the role of the ruling party, UNIP, in the electoral process by assigning it the tasks of: (i) candidate selection, (ii) formulation of the election programs, and (iii) handling election campaigns for both the Parliamentary and Presidential elections. The Presidential elections operated on a two-stage, single candidate system. The first stage involved only the party. The person elected as Party President at the UNIP General Conference automatically became, by virtue of his post, the sole presidential candidate. The second stage provided for a direct affirmation (or rejection) of the sole candidate by the electorate. The voters had a choice of marking 'Yes' or 'No' against the name of the presidential candidate. To retain or attain the Presidency, the candidate had to receive at least 51% 'Yes' votes out of the total votes.

    Frederick Chiluba's 1991 landslide victory of 76% vote share ousted President Kenneth Kaunda, who had ruled Zambia for 27 years, and marked the restoration of multiparty politics and democracy. Zambia has now held

background of developments which have been taking place since independence. There are several additional factors

which might explain the declining poll. However, ethnicity and language composition, in this case, become a major factor.

A similar trend of low voter turnout continued in subsequent election polls until 1991 when President Frederick Chiluba won a landslide victory. Many scholars such as Posner (2005), Bratton (1999) and Rakner (2002) have argued that Chiluba's landslide victory was not influenced by any ethnic affiliation, but by the shift to multiparty politics and the quest for the Zambians to escape the IMF sanctions that were brought about in the Kaunda era (Chipenzi et al., 2011). For many scholars, this was the only time when Zambians based their voting on party manifestos and policies (Chipenzi et al., 2011, p. 61). Notably, while Kaunda's policies insisted on government monopolies, Chiluba believed that privatization was the solution. Chiluba's policies attracted Western attention and support because they reflected the ideas of democracy. However, after the 1991 victory and the dawning of multi-party democracy in Zambia, the society reverted to the old trend of voting based on tribal affiliations and not on policies. To date this debate of whether people in Zambia vote based on policies or tribal affiliations has not been reconciled. This is because when one talks about the issue of tribalism in Zambian politics, others challenge them as inciting violence by playing an ethnic card. Thus, it is only through evidence that it can be concluded that voters cast their votes based on tribal affiliations and not on party policies.

Corruption and tribal cleavages in the Zambian politics

The tendency of pioneering ethnicity as the variable to explain why people would vote for one candidate over the other has taken root in the Zambian politics. However, scholars such as Kasoma (2009) refute the proposition that people vote on ethnic lines, asserting that corruption is instead a driving factor (This means that one can vote for any candidate regardless of their ethnicity if they are bribed). Kasoma perceives corruption in form of offering or accepting gifts for a favor. While this is a generally accepted definition, Kotecha and Adams (1981) and Burke (1991) assert that it is impossible in Africa to talk about corruption without linking it to tribalism. The two authors define corruption as a means of consolidating incumbents' personal clientless and coalitions (p.86). The term here is used as a synonym for certain specific types of behavior as proposed in McMullan (1961)'s straightforward definition: A public official is corrupt if he accepts money for doing something that he is under duty to do anyway, or that he is under duty not to do, or to exercise legitimate discretion for improper reasons (p. 319). Unlike Kasoma's perspective, this definition includes the acceptance of

bribes and kickbacks, as well as extortion by public officials.

The last phrase of the definition accommodates a wide variety of ways in which an official may use discretionary powers for his/her own political or economic benefit. However, McMullan fails to include one important form of corruption that is common in Zambia, namely nepotism or the practice of putting one's kin on the public payroll. According to Wilson (1966), bribery and nepotism were common forms of corruption in Great Britain during the 18th Century. This was a time when Britain was also attaining colonies including Zambia. Wilson thus asserts that there is a higher chance that Britain manifested tendencies of nepotism to their colonies. Similarly, Posner (2005) observes that nepotism is an important factor in Zambian politics. For Posner, Zambian voters seek to maximize the resources they can get from the state, such as jobs, development funds, agricultural subsidies, feeder roads, health clinics, relief food, and schools. The game of politics is thus understood to revolve around the transfer of these scarce and highly desired benefits by politicians in return for voters' political support (p. 3).

Posner is drawing his argument from Young and Turner (1985) who believe that politics in Africa was like 'cutting the national cake.' Young and Turner perceive the output of the state to be divisible into slices of possibly unequal size, sweet to the taste, and intended to be eaten (p. 147). However, Young and Turner ignore the role ethnic identity plays in determining the size of the slices. As Posner (2005), Barkan (1979), and Kanyinga (1994) assert, Zambian voters assume that access to resources will depend on electing politicians who belong to their ethnic group. That is why the competition for jobs, and other social benefits, becomes a struggle among ethnic communities to put one of their own into a position of political power (p. 4).

In the same way, voters in Zambia also seek access to state resources by allocating their electoral support to members of their own ethnic groups, who they assume will be more likely than non-co-ethnics to redistribute those resources to them (Posner, p. 1304). This in some ways compels candidates not to ignore the ethnic card, but play it through bribery and nepotism. In this way, ethnicity, through illicit kickbacks, assumes a position of respectability in election campaigns not because of people lack information, but because voters see that as the only way they could have a share of the national cake. Posner concludes by saying that corruption provides a cue that helps voters distinguish promises that are credible from promises that are not. In other words, the bribes from politicians provide an assurance for sharing the national cake because either the candidate or the voter believes someone owes them something.

Education and tribal cleavages

Plethora studies have pointed to the importance of education in the way people choose to vote for one candidate over the other. For instance, Teixeira (1987), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and Verba et al. (1995),

found out that education was the most and important predictor of voting behavior in the United States. In Zambia, education is believed to give people an appreciation for opinions different from their own (Moyo, 2011). A working paper from the Afrobarometer supports this theory by arguing that increased levels of education within the same country decrease ethnic alignments except in situations where a country is a quasi-democracy or an electoral autocracy (Kwenzi and Lambright, 2005). The two authors used data from Zambia and found out that better-educated citizens had a better ability to engage in civic life and were more likely to support free and fair elections that are based on good party policies. In contrast, less educated people did not care about the policies of the party they chose to vote for, but on how well the candidate articulated themselves. Therefore, the study questions the degree to which education levels affected the voting behavior of the Zambian people.

Policy-based electoral debates

Apart from the need for free and fair elections, there is also a question of the quality of the people seeking to be elected. One feature of Zambian politics that has been noted by many critiques is that it lacks substance. A Zambian based think-tank, Jesuit Center for Theological Reflections on the essentials of the democratic process, observes that political debates in Zambia are characterized more by character persecution than policy discourse. They continue to argue that, politicians in Zambia spend more time and energy slighting their opponents than in articulating their views on development and other issues of similar importance (p. 11). Hence, people vote for candidates even though they have little or no knowledge of the policies of the party they are voting for. Their choice of candidate tends to base on factors and criteria that are of no immediate relevance, such as, the tribe of the candidate, his/her perceived wealth, or illusionary and dishonest promises of immediate political and economic gratification (Posner, p.1304; Von-Soest: 2007). Based on the aforementioned overview, the study advances the argument that 'Free and 'Fair' elections can only be attained when people vote based on the comprehensive understanding of party policies. Therefore, the question of why people get to vote for one candidate over the other becomes important. As argued earlier, various reasons might be at play. The standing hypothesis at this point is that the people of Zambia do not vote for a presidential candidate based on the policies the party adopts, but on ethnic identification and alignment.

Theoretical framework

Various frameworks about voting behavior have come to light since the 1960s when Lipset and Rokkan (1967) developed the structural theory of voting behavior. The three authors were responding to the trend of voting behaviors that emerged in Western Europe during the 1960s. The authors observed that at that time, Western European politics were characterized by social identities which were centered on class inequalities, sectarian and regional cleavages. Horowitz (1985) advanced this theory by directly linking social cleavages to ethnicity. He thus argued that ethnicity had a very strong impact on the psychological behavior of voters. Unlike Green and Shapiro (1994)'s pathologies for rational choice, voting for Lipset, Seymour, & Rokkan, entails, an expression of group loyalty and identity.

Around the same period, Tajfel (1981) developed a more specific framework entitled, "Social Identity Theory" (SIT). For Tajfel, people behave according to the standards and dispositions of the groups they align themselves to. This implies that identity emerges from individual's sense of belonging that is exhibited through self-esteem. This tie is so strong that the behavior of an individual is translated into the behavior of the group (Mitchel, 1981). That is why Adjei (2012) asserts that individuals in such situations tend to protect their tribes by building solidarity and normative protective culture that socialize tribes into believing that theirs in the best (p.9). It is no wonder that they vote for a candidate from their ethnic classification who is, in their belief, the best. While it is clear that the voting behavior can be influenced by tribal and ethnic alignments, it is inconclusive as to whether this might be the only determining factor. We thus pretested other explanatory variables such as apathy and employment. The argument is that the level of education determines whether someone would be voting based on ethnicity identities or not.

Therefore, we can draw some hypotheses from the discussed theories by asserting that the people of Zambia massively voted in the 2011 elections based on a candidate's affiliation with the voters' tribe or ethnic language. In our hypotheses, we contend that:

1. People in provinces with a higher composition of Bemba voted for Michael Sata and those with higher Tonga composition voted for Hakainde Hichilema.
2. The districts with higher levels of corruption had voted more on ethnic lines than those that showed fewer levels of corruption. Existing literature indicates that tribalism and corruption are deeply intertwined. The assumption is that corrupt constituencies had a higher chance of encouraging election behaviors that were based on ethnicity.
3. The provinces with high levels of education were knowledgeable enough not to vote based on ethnic affiliations, but for a candidate whom they considered qualified to foster national development.

METHODS

Conceptualization and operationalization

Data selection

The availability of secondary data from the Zambia Electoral

Commission enabled us to examine voting behaviors in the 2011 presidential elections. The 2011 presidential election results were given precedence because of the way they treated independent variables. Unlike other presidential elections in Zambia, the 2011 elections did not exhibit a lot of nascent intervening variable. Other elections, such as the 1991 elections have other variables other than language composition, corruption, and education that can explain why people voted for one candidate other the other. However, percentage results of the 2006 and 2008 presidential elections were included, but only as a reference and supporting evidence for the 2011 study results.

Dependent variables: Sata and HH's shares of the 2011 total votes

The focus of this study is voting behavior in the Zambian 2011 presidential elections. Behavior is measured by a single question about whether people voted for Michael Sata/Hakainde Hichilema based on their good policies, or on how ethnically aligned they were to them. Therefore, President Michael Sata's share vote and that of his rival Hakainde Hichilema were statistically regressed in Stata against the three independent variables: Language, Education, and Corruption. Further, percentage votes from the clustered 7 ethnic languages of the 73 Zambian tribes were equally quantified. This was done so as to determine where each candidate got the most votes. The results of the 2011 presidential elections were later compared to two other overarching ethnically aligned presidential results in which Hakainde Hichilema had contested.

Independent variables: Education, language, and corruption

In the analysis of this study, factors identified in the literature as influencing voting behavior in the 2011 Zambian elections were examined. While literature identifies a plethora of variables as affecting voter behavior, only education, language, and corruption were found to have a positive correlation with the dependent variables. Other variables such as apathy, employment, and social economic conditions were equally pre-tested but found not to have a significant correlation.

Operationalization of the independent variables

Hypothesis testing within a quantitative environment requires both sets of variables to be readily inputted as factors of an equation. In the case of social science, many variables are not easily reduced to numerical scales due to their multi-dimensionality. In this case, language composition and corruption percentages were complex to compute even though we had existing data at hand. Such qualities are therefore difficult to incorporate into a single dimension equation. In order to retain a simple single dimensional analysis, it is common for only one element to be crudely quantified and then tested in the equation. Such an approach is, by necessity, a crude approximation of 'degrees' and 'percentages' and yet enables simple statistical analyses. Consequently, the variables require indicators that not only represent some quality of the original form but are also able to undergo statistical analysis.

The official document from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) provided data on the 2011 presidential results, language composition and employment levels for each constituency and district. The Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) document provided data on the levels of corruption in each district and constituency. In calculating the Bribery Index, they quantitatively used 'Excel pivot' tables and cross tabulation to disaggregate the data so as to provide an empirical evidence base that could enhance knowledge of bribery, anti-corruption success, and indications of social groupings most affected. Demographic and corruption knowledge data from the questionnaire was interrogated against questions on the ZBPI survey key performance indicators (KPI). Calculation of the aggregate bribery index of the ZBPI was based on the weighted average of the 3 key performance indicators, which are incidence prevalence and frequency of bribery, for all the target public institutions covered in the survey. First, the weighted average score for each individual target institution within a constituency was computed and then the aggregate bribery index was derived from it. The respective formulae are:

Denotations: I = Incidence; P = Prevalence; and, F = Frequency.
Σ denotes SUM (addition of a group of numbers)

$$Overall\ Aggregate\ Bribery\ Index = \frac{\Sigma\ (Weighted\ Average\ Score)}{No.\ of\ Institutions}$$

Note that, the KPIs weighted average is multiplied by 100 to reduce it to a percent. And for an individual institution, this provides the aggregate index.

Data on the education level of each constituency was collected from the Zambia Education Statistical Bulletin which processes data through a Microsoft Access based software Ed*ASSIST. This software has inbuilt formulas to compute all the necessary indicators. Indicators not captured under standard reports can be generated through queries to the database. Before data are disseminated to stakeholders, they undergo cleaning where sample questionnaires are taken from headquarters and compared with those in the schools to validate them and ensure that they have the same information. Population projections used to calculate data within this report have been harmonized with the Central Statistics Office's (CSO) official population projections.

Contextual variables

The study also reviewed and analyzed the contents of the manifestos for Sata's PF party and Hakainde's UPND party. The objective was to assess whether the two manifestos and policies are different. In this way, the study will be able to argue as to whether people in Zambia vote based on policies or ethnic affiliation. Samples for both Sata and Hichilema were drawn from 150 constituencies of the 10 provinces of Zambia. Through scientific clustering and sampling of the 73 tribes into seven (7) languages, the results project to the population of voters across the country with an equal representation. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the most robust study of Zambian voting behavior ever attempted.

RESULTS

The results of the study are purely based on the analysis of a model built upon variables influencing election results. Language composition, education levels, and corruption levels of each constituency were identified as the main independent variables. Data were collected from the Zambia Electoral Commission, The Zambia Bribery Index, and the Zambia Education Bulletin of the election year. Since a change in any independent variable might affect a

change in the results, everything was limited to the year 2011. Therefore, the model is as follows:

1. Sata's share = α + β₁ (Language Comp) + β₂ (Education) + β₃ (Corruption)

Sata's share = $\alpha + \beta_1$ (Language Comp) + β_2 (Education) + β_3 (Corruption)

Table 3A. Correlation of Sata's share against Independent variables

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	91732.0979	3	30577.366			
Residual	30474.1815	146	208.727271			
Total	122206.279	149	820.176372			

Number of obs = 150
F(3, 146) = 146.49
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.7506
Adj R-squared = 0.7455
Root MSE = 14.447

Satasharep~t	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Education	.4911976	.0374866	13.10	0.000	.4171111	.5652841
Language	-.0350029	.0511662	-0.68	0.495	-.136125	.0661192
Corruption	.6151231	.1180164	5.21	0.000	.3818819	.8483644
_cons	9.634925	1.992514	4.84	0.000	5.697028	13.57282

Table 3B. Correlation of HH's share against Independent variables.

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	36434.5635	3	12144.8545			
Residual	58695.1533	146	402.021598			
Total	95129.7168	149	638.454475			

Number of obs = 150
F(3, 146) = 30.21
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.3830
Adj R-squared = 0.3703
Root MSE = 20.05

HHshareper~t	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Education	.3668574	.0499497	7.34	0.000	.2681396	.4655752
Language	.0384125	.0709362	0.54	0.589	-.101782	.178607
Corruption	-.1967857	.1597402	-1.23	0.220	-.5124876	.1189162
_cons	1.260392	4.493277	0.28	0.779	-7.619876	10.14066

2. HH's share = α + β₁ (Language Comp) + β₂ (Education) + β₃ (Corruption)

To test the hypotheses, the share of each of the two candidates was registered separately against the three independent variables. The sample was split into Sata and Hakainde's shares and a simple regression model used in Stata to determine the correlations. Initially, each independent variable was separately correlated with the dependent variable. This was done so as to determine which independent variable had a strong causal effect. Tables 3A and 3B indicate the above-mentioned correlations.

Table 3A shows the results of test. A simple regression was run with robust standard errors for President Michael Sata's share of the 2011 elections total vote. Various independent variables, such as employment, apathy, and economic conditions were pre-tested against the dependent variable. Their lack of correlation resulted to the decision of ruling them out of the equation. It is also believed that their inclusion would water down the p-values of other significant variables.

Tables 3A and 3B exposes several interesting patterns worth talking about. While the results of coefficients present a similar pattern, their R-Squares are rather very different. Table 3A yielded an R-Square of 0.75% to indicate that the independent variables have the capacity to explain the dependent variable by 75%. However, Table 3B's explanatory power is limited to 38%. Nonetheless, the fact that language demonstrates a correlation with a

statistically significant p-value, is important in this case. This demonstrates that tribal alignments highly characterize the voting behavior of the Zambian people.

This argument is equally supported in Table 4 that is based on data compiled from the Zambia Electoral Commission document. For easy interpretation, party

Table 4. Percentage of the vote and party support by tribal group in the clustered 7 languages.

Parameter	A. President (%)		B. President (%)		Total
	Sata	HH	Sata	HH	
Bemba	91.4	2.9	67.2	20.8	54
Kaonde	15.2	75	16.2	74.1	4
Lunda	10.4	82.7	11.8	81.4	18
Luvale	17.5	71.5	51.0	36.6	11
Tonga	3.51	93.35	10.4	82.7	8
Lozi	23.7	23.7	26.6	54.2	22.1
Nyanja	56.3	36.6	71.5	10.8	15
Effective No.	4.9	1.9			

A. % of vote by tribe, B. Party support by tribe.

shares were collated as percentages from the seven tribal affiliations. In Table 4, columns A and B present data on the percentage of the vote by a tribe and party support within the same tribes. Column A examines the contribution made by each tribe of the seven groups to the party. Using the standard formula, the effective number of these tribes was calculated by dividing one with the sum of the squared share of each tribe. Based on the calculations of the effective number, HH's share indicates that tribalism accounts for less than a quarter of Sata's. Significantly, column A demonstrates that both parties receive huge amounts of support from the tribes they are affiliated to.

On the other hand, column B examines party support within each of the seven tribes, against Sata's and HH's share. Interesting patterns emerge in this column as well. While the Nyanja tribe is believed to be overwhelmingly correlated to the Bemba tribe, about 20% of the votes seem to rest on neither Sata nor HH. In fact, HH's share from the Nyanja-speaking localities is reasonably high. It is interesting to also note that a Nyanja with a small party also contested for the presidency, but did not get higher votes as Sata or HH. In other words, while the voting pattern in 'some' provinces is arguably impartial, one cannot help but notice patterns that describe ethnic voting in provinces like Northwestern, Luapula, Northern and Southern.

The 2011 results verses 2006 and 2008 presidential results: A comparison

A number of elections have taken places in Zambia since 1964. While there are several that would exhibit an ethnically aligned voting behavior, the split between Michael Sata and Hakainde Hichilema's votes exhibit a pattern of tribal voting behaviors. Table 5A and B presents the summary result of the 2006 results as presented in the 'African Election Tripod' database.

Tables 5A and 5B present data that is designed to support the argument that people in Zambia cast their votes based on ethnic ties and not policies of the parties as others would argue. As observed in our statistical regressions, Table 5 presents a pattern voting that correlates with ethnic affiliations. While the patterns in some constituencies are arguably impartial, it is impossible not to notice the turnout in provinces like Copperbelt, Northern, Muchinga and Luapula that align with Sata's tribe, and The Southern province, whose alignment is with Hichilema. This demonstrates a split in shares that are hard to interpret when we assume that party policies were at play. For example, the 82.09% of Hichilema over the 1% of Michael Sata does not reflect a voting behavior driven by policy or party manifesto, but by how much the voters felt affiliated to the candidate.

In the same way, the 2008 presidential election results indicate that Sata and Hakainde's votes were skewed towards their alignments. For example, in the Northern province, President Sata scored 65% while his opponent, Hakainde Hichilema had 1.3% in total. However, HH also scored 72% in the Southern province, while Sata had only 4.8%. Such discrepancies in the share of votes cannot dispute the argument that the 2011 presidential elections followed suit. Similar patterns are observed in other candidates such as Rupiah Banda, who scored a number of votes from his regional places. It is however disputed that Banda's votes might have been more influenced by other variables and developmental projects of the MMD.

UPND and PF party manifestos: A comparative analysis

By textually analyzing the two policy documents of the Patriotic Front (PF) and United Party for National Development (UPND), we discovered that both documents only differ in name and not content. While

UPND's manifesto was entitled "Realize the dream of a better Zambia through real change", the PF had "For lower taxes, more jobs, more money in your pockets" as their theme. An introspection in the documents is that both manifestos pledged to achieve the following objectives: Education development, the creation of jobs, agriculture development, poverty reduction, good governance and

Table 5A. The 2006 election results showing an ethnic correlation in voting behavior.

Constituency	Province	ADD%	FDD%	HERITAGE%	MMD%	NAREP%	NMP%	PF%	UNIP%	UPND%	ZED%
Nchanga	C/Belt	0.08	3.33	0.19	11.05	0.1	0.09	81.81	0.11	3.22	0.02
Gwembe	Southern	0.19	0.29	0.49	11.11	0.34	0.28	1.62	0.56	84.93	0.18
Monze C.	Southern	0.09	0.07	0.14	11.43	1.4	0.08	4.51	0.26	81.98	0.03
Kachibuya	Muchinga	0.36	0.13	0.14	11.92	0.17	0.36	86.12	0.19	0.46	0.16
Shingwandu	Muchinga	0.13	0.12	0.13	11.92	0.63	0.31	84.62	0.22	0.39	0.13
Magoye	Southern	0.12	0.12	0.28	13.33	0.24	0.3	2.21	0.29	82.4	0.05
Bangweulu	Luapula	0.1	0.17	0.11	13.99	0.24	0.19	83.64	0.1	1.05	0.15
Pemba	Southern	0.14	0.84	0.31	14.26	0.45	0.2	1	0.52	82.09	0.09
Malole	Northern	0.13	0.09	0.09	14.36	0.32	0.5	83.95	0.12	0.6	0.1
Nkana	C/Belt	0.11	0.07	0.14	14.44	0.18	0.12	81.56	0.04	3.23	0.04

Source: Africanelectiontripod.com.

Table 5B. The 2008 election results indicating an ethnic correlation in voting behavior.

	30 October 2008 Presidential Election									
	Province									National Total
Candidate (Party)	Central	Copperbelt	Eastern	Luapula	Lusaka	Northern	North-Western	Southern	Western	
Rupiah Banda (MMD)	82,178 (53.80%)	105,225 (32.26%)	148,197 (74.46%)	32,552 (27.83%)	90,057 (30.28%)	67,237 (32.81%)	59,370 (57.59%)	51,550 (20.79%)	81,993 (68.38%)	718,359 (40.63%)
Michael Sata (PF)	37,656 (24.65%)	201,087 (61.65%)	37,295 (18.74%)	82,418 (70.47%)	162,107 (54.51%)	134,244 (65.50%)	4,586 (4.45%)	11,866 (4.78%)	11,891 (9.92%)	683,150 (38.64%)
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)	31,821 (20.83%)	17,846 (5.47%)	11,624 (5.84%)	1,588 (1.36%)	43,515 (14.63%)	2,660 (1.30%)	38,265 (37.12%)	180,976 (72.98%)	24,723 (20.62%)	353,018 (19.96%)
Godfrey Miyanda (HP)	1,080 (0.71%)	2,022 (0.62%)	1,926 (0.97%)	389 (0.33%)	1,697 (0.57%)	801 (0.39%)	876 (0.85%)	3,593 (1.45%)	1,299 (1.08%)	13,683 (0.77%)
Total Valid Votes	**152,735**	**326,180**	**199,042**	**116,947**	**297,376**	**204,942**	**103,097**	**247,985**	**119,906**	**1,768,210**
Invalid/Blank Votes	**2,544**	**4,016**	**3,464**	**1,393**	**3,472**	**2,572**	**1,527**	**2,863**	**1,745**	**23,596**
Total Votes	**155,279**	**330,196**	**202,506**	**118,340**	**300,848**	**207,514**	**104,624**	**250,848**	**121,651**	**1,791,806**
Registered Voters	**382,349**	**625,848**	**499,984**	**312,857**	**592,868**	**465,172**	**244,815**	**503,801**	**316,441**	**3,944,135**
Voter Turnout	**40.60%**	**52.80%**	**40.50%**	**37.80%**	**50.70%**	**44.60%**	**42.70%**	**49.80%**	**38.40%**	**45.40%**

Source: Africanelectiontripod.com

women empowerment. In their campaign messages, the creation of jobs for the youth was the most pivotal issue. However, none of the two candidates explained how they would do this. One among the most remembers campaign message for Michael Sata was to empower local investors and only international investors that would pledge to employ a lot of the youth from within Zambia. According to the Zambian Daily mail, Sata appealed to many Zambians in his campaign messages by playing the 'job creation' card; a challenge that everyone faces. The paper noted that this was the most salient problem that the paper brought about.

Second, agriculture was the second important thing in their manifestos and campaign messages. While the focus was on increasing food supplies, there was less emphasis on the how.

Most of their descriptions were legal, and broad in nature. The UPND focused on subsidies and loans for farmers; a thing that PF equally talked about in their campaign messages. However, PF's manifesto was vague in the sense that they did not specify on how they intended to diversify agriculture as stated in their manifesto. While it is argued that other policies were equally covered, the divergence in the policy characterized both the UPND and PF campaign messages. This led to many questioning whether those promises were indeed achievable as simply stated. Therefore, the two issues mentioned above dominating the campaign messages leave behind a lot of questions. Most prominently, one would question about the degree to which 'job creation and agriculture strategies' influenced the voting behavior of the Zambian people. Many would argue that these campaign messages had no bearing on the voting behavior of the Zambian people during the 2011 elections.

DISCUSSION

In a sharp departure from previous elections, the findings in this study present voting behaviors characterized by irrational voting as defined by Downs (1957). The results presented give credence to two main things about the voting behavior in the 2011 Zambian presidential elections: First, is that people voted for a candidate in relation to ethnic/tribe alignments and second, is that party policies did not affect the way people chose to vote for one candidate over the other. Essentially, evidence shows that the total election votes were split between the Bembas (Sata's group) and the Tongas HH's group. Most of the losing votes went to other less popular political parties, which the study asserts came from people that might have voted based on either apathy or a good understanding of party policies. In a strict sense, such trends are detrimental to multi-party democracy that Zambia claims to embrace. The reality is that multi-party democracy seeks to project fairness and equity in the distribution of all forms of country resources. This includes the right to information about the manifestos and viable policy implementations of political parties. If tribal alignments characterize and influence Zambia's voting behavior, credibility, competence, and achievement will be sacrificed. National identity is a pillar for multi-party democracy (Anderson, 1991). It is therefore logical to conclude that a country divided by ethnic alignments will lose its national identity. As buttressed by Nueberger (2000), you cannot have both ethnic identifications and democracy. Nueberger gives four reasons why he thinks this is impossible: (1) That it is hard to define a state's interests if the people within a country were divided; (2) That in ethnic voting, people base their arguments on identities and not policies; (3) That voting behavior characterized by ethnicity is a recipe for election fraud in a zero-sum situation; and (4) That ethnic alignments are recipes for civil wars.

Therefore, the trend shown in the Zambian 2011 elections is detrimental to Zambia's quest for multi-party democracy. The first step Zambia needs to take is to accept the prevalence of a voting behavior characterized by ethnic alignments. It is only through such steps that remedies will be sought. Otherwise, if not addressed, it will be perpetuated and bring about many other vices detrimental to the development of the country. This has been witnessed in many neighboring countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and even Burundi and South Sudan.

Limitation

Two major limitations were observed in this study: The exclusive use of secondary data from the Zambian government documents and the employment of a single year case. These two problems can be improved by complementing one-on-one interviews with the voters (e.g. Asking them why they voted for one candidate over the other, and how much they know about party policies) and comparing the 2011 results with other years of elections. Specifically, 1973, 1996, 2006 and 2016 would be interesting years to compare with. An ideal study would be to study all the elections years of Zambia and analyze the tribal alignments. Above all, it is important to note that studies on voting behavior in Zambia and Africa at large will always be contested.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Broadly, this study has argued that an ethnic/tribal aligned voting behavior characterized the 2011 Zambian presidential elections. We started with the purpose of finding out whether people in Zambia vote on tribal affiliations or on the good policies manifested in the party manifestos. Given the complexity of tribal affiliations, the study tackled ethnicity, tribalism, and language as synonymous to one another. These variables are highly correlated to a degree that using one for the other makes no difference. The discussions and data presented demonstrate a potential phenomenon to the fledging 'free and fair' policies of multi-party democracy. Therefore, the theory of ethnicity is supported by the evidence presented in the statistical results.

On the other hand, the study establishes the fact that the policies found in the Zambian political parties' manifestos do not influence the voting behavior of the Zambian people. Policies should matter, but the textual analysis of the two manifestos of the PF party and UPND indicated no difference in content and execution.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors has not declared any conflict of interests

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